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Abstract—In Mobile Ad-hoc Networks, nodes exchange packets 
with each other using intermediate nodes as relays. Since nodes in 
MANETs are battery powered, energy conservation is a crucial 
issue. Accepting relay all request may not be in the best interest of 
a node. But if many nodes prefer not to consume energy in relaying 
packets on behalf of others, the overall performance of routing in 
network will be influenced. In this paper we address the energy-
efficient routing problem in MANETs with selfish nodes. We 
modeled this problem as a game-theoretic constraint optimization; 
we defined the utility of each node as a weighted difference between 
a performance metric and some transmission costs. A motivate 
mechanism is proposed in order to induce nodes to forwarding 
cooperation. Each node independently implements the optimal 
equilibrium strategy under the given constraints. Simulation 
results by NS3 simulator show that our proposed approach can 
improve system performance in network lifetime and packet 
delivery ratio. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is a collection of 
wireless mobile nodes that out of necessity form a network 
required to facilitate communication. The network does not 
have infrastructure per say, and the nodes freely move. Each 
node must work as a router and forward messages to the 
appropriate device. Since mobile ad hoc networks change their 
topology frequently without prior notice, routing in such 
networks is a challenging task, in recent years, many routing 
protocols have been proposed for MANETs. These protocols 
can be classified into three different groups: proactive, reactive 
and hybrid. In proactive routing protocols such as DSDV [1] and 
OLSR [2], the routes to all the destination (or parts of the 
network) are determined at the start up, and maintained by using 
a periodic route   update process. In reactive protocols such as 
AODV [3] and DSR [4] routes are determined when they are 
required by the source using a route discovery process. Hybrid 
routing protocols combines the basic properties of the first two 
classes of protocols into one. In particular, energy efficient 
routing may be the most important design criteria for MANETs, 
since mobile nodes will be powered by batteries with limited 
capacity. Power failure of a mobile node not only affects the 
node itself but also its ability to forward packets on behalf of 
others and thus the overall network lifetime. Simple routing 
schemes are sufficient only if all nodes are willing to participate 
in the forwarding. However, nodes are energy constrained by  
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their battery level and want to maximize their lifetime, which 
leads to potential selfishness as the nodes may refuse to forward 
packets for other nodes. Forwarding for other nodes’ packets 
consumes a node’s limited energy. Therefore a node has no 
interest in forwarding packets on behalf of another node, thus if 
many of the nodes act selfishly, few multi-hop communications 
can take place and the network functionality is compromised. 
Hence, it is necessary to design a mechanism to enforce 
cooperation for packet forwarding among greedy and 
distributed nodes. 
In order to overcome this problem, several authors have 
recently proposed stimulating cooperation using incentives, to 
enforce cooperation for packet forwarding among nodes. Most 
of the approaches proposed in the literature, such as those 
presented in [5] and [6], are focused on the packet forwarding 
phase of a routing protocol, relatively little attention has been 
devoted to the problem of stimulating cooperation in the route 
discovery phase of a routing protocol. We investigate that a 
suitable tool for modeling the routing behaviors in MANETs 
with nodes’ selfishness is game theory [7]. 
In this paper, we define a non-cooperative game theoretic 
model to support more energy-aware routing in MANETs under 
the constraint of nodes’ selfishness. The proposed model uses 
local information. So, it is applicable in MANETs. We integrate 
this model to OLSR protocol that is an optimization over the 
classical link state protocol for the MANETs. Simulation results 
show that our proposed model improves. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 
2 we shortly describe the related work. Section 3 presents brief 
review of OLSR routing protocol. Section 4 discusses our 
proposed routing scheme. The performance of this approach is 
evaluated by extensive simulation; which is presented in Section 
5. Finally the conclusion remarks are given in Section 6. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The problem of obtaining cooperative routing behavior in 
wireless ad hoc networks consisting of inherently selfish nodes 
has received considerable attention in recent years. Therefore, 
many protocols and algorithms have been proposed to 
circumvent this problem. As nodes in MANETs are generally 
battery-operated, to maximize the energy efficiency as much as 
possible, the first attribute that has to be conserved is energy 
consumption. As a consequence, plenty of research efforts in 
energy-aware routing for MANETs become predominant. In [8] 
Jung and Hundewale have applied new energy efficiency 
metrics to MANET routing protocol, they used adaptive load 
balancing model. Yet they haven’t uncovered sufficient detail 
about how to fulfill energy load balancing in mobile ad-hoc 
networks. In [9] Feeney has presented a technique for evaluating 
the consumption energy manner in mobile ad-hoc networks, this 
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technique was used to investigate the energy consumption of 
few MANET routing protocol. In [10] Khouzani and Eshghi 
have examined the purpose of epidemic routing in energy 
constrained DTN. They argued that dynamic optimal strategies 
simulate some threshold-based principles. 
Several authors have proposed stimulating cooperation, to 
handle the problem of routing in MANETs with selfish nodes, 
using incentives. For instance, in [11] Manam and Mahendran 
have investigated an analytical method to evaluate the 
effectiveness of some routing protocols considering that 
consists of selfish nodes that have different ranges of 
transmission. However Wang and Singhal in [12] have proposed 
a novel routing algorithm for MANETs with selfish nodes. They 
present a protocol using a motivating mechanism to promote 
cooperation among nodes, their proposition concentrate on the 
truthfulness. Watchdog and pathrater are proposed in [13] to 
identify misbehaving nodes and deflect traffic around them. 
Reputation-based protocols are proposed in [14] and [15]. In 
[16] a novel mechanism has proposed to present cooperation 
among nodes. In [17] Felegyhazi and Hubaux have used game 
theory and graph theory to prove that cooperation for packet 
forwarding can be implemented without incentive mechanisms. 
In [18] Srinivasan and Nuggehalli have proposed another type 
of game theory called tit for tat, to overcome selfishness 
problem in packet forwarding. However in [19] Srinivasan, 
Nuggehalli, Chiasserini, and Rao have applied game theory to 
get a distributed algorithm based on which nodes decide 
whether or not to accept a relay request. Naserian and Tepein 
[20] have proposed a routing protocol based on forwarding 
game for MANET. In their protocol, a node enters the 
forwarding game upon receiving a flooding packet. Parameters 
such as residual energy level, channel congestion, number of 
packets in the node’s transmission queue, and the distance from 
the source of the flooding packet are included for computing 
utility. 
In our work, we have modeled a forwarding cooperation for 
Multi Point Relay selection algorithm in OLSR routing 
protocol, by adopting an incentive mechanism and a non-
cooperative game theory. We have illustrated that our algorithm 
leads to Nash equilibrium, which can be used to improve energy 
efficiency in MANETs routing. 
III. BRIEF REVIEW OF OLSR ROUTING PROTOCOL 
OLSR (Optimized Link State Routing), [2], is a proactive 
routing protocol where nodes periodically exchange topology 
information in order to establish a route to any destination in the 
network. It is an optimization of a pure link state routing 
protocol, based on the concept of multipoint relays (MPRs). 
First, using multipoint relays reduces the size of the control 
messages: rather than declaring all its links in the network, a 
node declares only the set of links with its neighbors that have 
selected it as “multipoint relay”. The use of MPRs also 
minimizes flooding of control traffic (fig. 1). Indeed only 
multipoint relays forward control messages. This technique 
significantly reduces the number of retransmissions of broadcast 
messages. OLSR consists of two main functionalities: 
•Neighborhood discovery. Each node acquires the knowledge 
of its one-hop and two-hop neighborhood by periodic Hello 
messages. It independently selects its own set of multipoint 
relays (MPRs), among its one-hop neighbors in such a way that 
its MPRs cover (in terms of radio range) all its two-hop 
neighbors. 
•Topology dissemination. Each node also maintains 
topological information about the network obtained by TC 
(Topology Control) messages, broadcast by MPR nodes. 
Each node computes its routing table by the Dijkstra 
algorithm. This table provides the shortest route (i.e. the route 
with the smallest hop number) to any destination in the network. 
 
 
Fig 1. MPR Mechanism 
IV. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
A. Application Scenario and Motivation Mechanism 
 
An ad-hoc network is modeled as a graph G (V,E) where V 
represents the set of nodes and E is the set of links. Nodes in the 
network have limited energy depending on the initial battery-
power. In MANET routing each node generate packets 
representing many types of messages and send them to each 
other. A mobile node consumes its battery energy not only when 
it actively sends or receives packets, but also when it stays idle 
listening to the wireless medium for any possible 
communication requests from other nodes. 
A wireless node’s radio can be in one of the following four 
states: Transmit, Receive, listening or Sleep and each of which 
consumes different levels of energy. 
• Transmit: when a node is transmitting a packet to another 
node with transmission energy ET; 
• Receive: when a node is receiving a packet from another 
node with reception energy ER. The receiving node may be 
the destination node or just an intermediate; 
• listening: Even when no messages are being transmitted 
over the medium, the nodes keep listening the medium 
with listening energy EL; 
• Sleep: when the radio is turned off and the node is not 
capable of detecting signals: no communication is possible. 
The node spends sleep energy ES that is largely smaller than 
any other energy. 
Generally any wireless network is following the above 
constraint: 
                               𝐸𝑇 > 𝐸𝑅 > 𝐸𝐿 > 𝐸𝑆                               (1) 
 
In Mobile Ad-hoc Networks, in order to minimize the 
overhead from flooding of control traffic, it uses only selected 
nodes (MPR) to retransmit control messages. This technique 
significantly reduces the number of retransmissions required to 
flood a message to all nodes in the network. The neighbors of 
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the transmitter which are not in its MPR set, receive and process 
broadcast messages but do not retransmit them. Maybe a node 
receives several messages from different transmitters at the 
same time. Then the receiver must determine which one to 
accept. Some message can be dropped, since each node has a 
limited data cache, which is used to store data packets for 
transmission. 
Some nodes in MANET behave with selfishness, since they 
want to maximize their benefits with least cost to conserve their 
energies as much as possible during the routing process, which 
can affect the entire network if many nodes behave like that. To 
overcome this problem, we have proposed a motive mechanism 
using local information, combining between motivate re-
transmitters and punishing selfish node. We use a weighted-
based evaluating scheme, where a weight called Participation 
Value (PV) is assigned dynamically at each node, the algorithm 
initially assign a PV equal to 0 to each node, then each time a 
node forward a packet for other nodes the PV will be 
incremented, and each time the node refuse to forward a packet, 
by passing to sleep mode, the PV will be decremented. If more 
than one transmitter sends packets to a receiver at the same time, 
the receiver will accept the packet from the one with larger PV. 
This approach indicates that nodes need to periodically receive 
other nodes PV. Thus it is crucial to find a way to propagate PV 
nodes to the neighbors without increasing network overhead. A 
convenient way is to include this information to the Hello 
packets that are periodically generated by each node. Therefore 
we extend the Hello packet to contain field for the PV of the 
sender node. 
 
B. Overview of Game Theory 
The purpose of game theory is a game which describes a 
formal model of an interactive situation. In describing a non-
cooperative game [21], the notion of a strategic form proves to 
be one of the most popular representations. In this regard, a non-
cooperative game in strategic has three components: the set of 
players, their strategies, and the payoffs or utilities. More 
formally, a strategic game is defined as follows: 
Definition.1 A non-cooperative game in strategic form is a 
triplet 𝐺 = (𝑁, (𝑆𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁, (𝑢𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁), where: 
• N is a finite set of players, i.e., N = {1,...,N}. 
• 𝑆𝑖 is the set of available strategies for player i. 
• 𝑢𝑖: 𝑆 →  ℝ is the utility (payoff) function for player i, with 𝑆 =
 𝑆1 × ∙∙∙ ×  𝑆𝑖 × ∙∙∙  𝑆𝑁. 
For any player i, every element 𝑠𝑖 ∈  𝑆𝑖 is the strategy of i, 
𝑠−𝑖 =  [𝑠𝑗]𝑗∈𝑁,𝑗≠𝑖 denote the vector of strategies off all players 
except i, and 𝑠 = (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠−𝑖) ∈ 𝑆 is referred to as a strategy profile. 
Whenever the sets of strategies 𝑆𝑖 are finite for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, the 
game is called finite. For a game in strategic form, each player 
has to select a strategy so as to optimize its utility function. 
Whenever each player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 selects a strategy 𝑠𝑖 ∈  𝑆𝑖 in a 
deterministic manner, i.e., with probability1, then this strategy 
is known as a pure strategy. In order to analyze a non-
cooperative game in strategic form, one must first clearly 
specify the players, their strategies, and their potential payoffs. 
In this context, any two-player non-cooperative finite game can 
be represented in a matrix format whereby the strategies of the 
players constitute the rows and columns of the matrix, and each 
element is a pair of numbers that represent the payoffs for the 
two players when a certain combination of strategies is used. 
The majority of non-cooperative games are not solvable by 
iterated dominance, so alternative solution concepts must 
investigated. In this regard, the most accepted solution concept 
for a non-cooperative game is that of a Nash equilibrium, a Nash 
equilibrium is a state of a non-cooperative game where no player 
can improve its utility by changing its strategy, if the other 
players maintain their current strategies. The Nash equilibrium 
is defined as follows: 
Definition.2 A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of a non-
cooperative game 𝐺 = (𝑁, (𝑆𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁 , (𝑢𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁) is a strategy profile 
𝑠∗ ∈ 𝑆such that ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 we have the following: 
 
                       𝑢𝑖(𝑠𝑖
∗, 𝑠−𝑖
∗ ) ≥  𝑢𝑖(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠−𝑖
∗ ), ∀𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖                    (2) 
 
In other words, a strategy profile is a pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium if no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate 
to another strategy, given that other players’ strategies remain 
fixed. 
 
C. Game Modeling 
In this section we present a new framework that allows 
investigating the problem of energy-efficiency routing in OLSR 
by modeling it as a non-cooperative game, as each player in a 
non-cooperative game, the nodes attempt to maximize their 
benefits by taking the suitable actions. We adopt this game when 
broadcasting control messages using MPRs, the MPRs are 
intermediates nodes that consume energy to forward packets for 
their MPR selectors (nodes that select them as MPRs). 
Let’s consider a simple game between a transmitter node nt 
and a re-transmitter node nr that’s one of its MPRs. The nt has 
to choose between two actions: either to select an MPR to 
retransmits it’s control message or not, while the nr can accept 
to forward or reject by passing to sleep mode according to 
energetic requirements. We assume that time is slotted, and 
nodes will take their actions simultaneously; in each time slot, a 
node is only allowed to one of its actions. Each node select it’s 
MPR set, in order to minimize the overhead of flooding 
messages in the network by reducing redundant retransmissions 
in the same region, so in this game, we consider this gain in 
energy as a benefit for this node (the transmitter). 
The utility function for a given transmitter node u(nt) and a re-
transmitter one u(nr) in this game is simply given as follow: 
To forward a broadcast message to the two-hop neighbors 
covered by an MPR node, if nt selects to do by means of MPR 
node nr and the latter being on active mode (accept to forward), 
the first and the second will spend the energy of transmission ET 
each, but we reward the nr with augmenting its PV by the 
number of two-hop neighbors nb2-hop covered by it. 
 
𝑢(𝑛𝑡) = −𝐸𝑇                                                   
𝑢(𝑛𝑟) = −𝐸𝑇  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑉 → 𝑃𝑉 + 𝑛𝑏2−ℎ𝑜𝑝 
 
but if nr being on sleep mode (reject to forward),we decrement 
its PV value by 1, the nr will retransmit the massage again by 
means of more one-hope neighbors to reach all the two-hop 
neighbors nb2-hop covered by this nr, in this case we need at least 
a number of retransmission equal to nb2-hop. So the utility 
functions will be as follows. 
 
 
𝑢(𝑛𝑡) = −𝐸𝑇 × (1 + 𝑛𝑏2−ℎ𝑜𝑝) 
𝑢(𝑛𝑟) = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑉 → 𝑃𝑉 − 1 
(3) 
(4) 




In the second case for nt, if it doesn’t adopt nr as MPR and the 
latter being ready to forward, we need at least a number of 
retransmission equal to nb2-hop directly, and the nr will spend the 
energy of listening EL correspondent to listening mode. So the 
utility functions will be as follows. 
 
𝑢(𝑛𝑡) = −𝐸𝑇 × 𝑛𝑏2−ℎ𝑜𝑝 
𝑢(𝑛𝑟) = −𝐸𝐿                       
 
Else if the nr being in sleep mode, we get the utility functions 
below. 
 
𝑢(𝑛𝑡) = −𝐸𝑇 × 𝑛𝑏2−ℎ𝑜𝑝                
𝑢(𝑛𝑟) = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑉 → 𝑃𝑉 − 1 
 





PAYOFF MATRIX FOR THE GAME 
nt                                nr Forward Sleep 
Select (−𝐸𝑇 , −𝐸𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑉 → 𝑃𝑉 + 𝑛𝑏2−ℎ𝑜𝑝) (−𝐸𝑇 × (1 + 𝑛𝑏2−ℎ𝑜𝑝), 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑉 → 𝑃𝑉 − 1) 




During the game, nodes will take different actions to 
maximize their benefit. The unique Nash Equilibrium in this 
game is that the nt broadcast control messages via nr as MPR 
and the latter retransmit. Nevertheless, a nr can base his decision 
on its energetic state or requirements, for example if its data 
cache is full in current slot, it won’t be able to receive more 
packets, or it has a low residual energy, it would rather choose 
not to participate in routing. For this purpose, we propose an 
indicator taking in consideration both residual energy and the 
MAC queue, based on it, the node decides either to retransmit 
or not. We compute an energetic cost 𝐸𝐶𝑖 and a MAC queue 
utilization cost 𝑀𝑄𝑈𝐶𝑖 for each node i, as shown in Equations 
(7) and (8). 
 
                                      𝐸𝐶𝑖 =
𝑅𝐸𝑖
𝐼𝐸
                                        (7) 
                                𝑀𝑄𝑈𝐶𝑖 =
𝑁𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥
                                  (8) 
 
Where 𝑅𝐸𝑖  is the residual energy at each time, 𝐼𝐸 is the initial 
energy of the node, 𝑁𝑃𝑖  is the number of packet in the MAC 
queue and 𝑀𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum considered MAC queue size. 
The decision taken by the nr is based on its 𝐸𝐶𝑖 and 𝑀𝑄𝑈𝐶𝑖 
values, if 𝐸𝐶𝑖 value is less than a given threshold α or 𝑀𝑄𝑈𝐶𝑖 
value is greater than a given threshold β, nr would rather choose 
not to participate in routing. The acceptance algorithm is as 
follows. 
• If 𝐸𝐶𝑖 < α   or   𝑀𝑄𝑈𝐶𝑖 > β  Reject 
• Else Accept. 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS 
In this section, we have simulated our modified version of 
OLSR using NS3 network simulator, to evaluate the 
performance of the proposed method. We considered three 
performance metrics to evaluate this approach, which are: 
Average Energy Consumption per node, Packet Lost Ratio, and 
Network Lifetime (the time until the battery of a mobile node 
depletes). We simulated a MANET with a variant number of 
nodes, within a 1500x1500 meter square region. There are 5 
UDP sources generating packets of 1024 bytes, we simulated 
each scenario 5 times, mobile nodes move in the area based on 
a Random Waypoint mobility model with maximum speed of 
15 m/sec, we took in this simulation α=0.15 as a threshold for 
the residual energy cost and β=0.95 as a threshold for the MAC 
queue utilization cost. The simulation time is set to 400 seconds. 
We executed the simulations to evaluate the efficiency of our 
modified scheme compared to the standard OLSR. Simulation 






Area 1500m x 1500m 
Nodes 30,40,50 
Traffic sources 5 
Traffic Type CBR / UDP 
Packet Size 
Start of Traffic 
Transmission Power 
Link bandwidth 

















In a first simulation, we simulated a MANET with 40 nodes, 
we intended to evaluate our proposed algorithm, from energy 
consumption point of view, by comparing the average node 
energy consumption by time, between modified and standard 
OLSR. The purpose is to perform an energy analysis of the 
behavior of our modified scheme. 
We present the results in Fig. 2. As shown in this figure, 
modified OLSR decreases energy consumption per node around 
6.5% as average diminishing. Energy consumption is directly 
related to the size and number of control packets generated by 
nodes. Thus, this indicates that our modified scheme achieves 
more uniform utilization of network resources by adopting the 
residual energy cost and MAC queue utilization cost of each 
node, and dispersing control messages through different re-
transmitters to reduce energy consumption. Meanwhile the 
standard OLSR rebroadcasts traffic controls using same 
(5) 
(6) 
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intermediate nodes, which results fast depletion of their battery 
powers that lead to more packet lost and then more 
retransmissions of control packets. 
In a second setup, in order to examine whether our approach 
contributes to the increase of network lifetime, without loss of 
performance, we simulated a MANET with a variant number of 
nodes (30, 40, 50 nodes), we considered two other performance 
metrics: Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) and Network Lifetime (in 
second). For network lifetime measurements, we execute the 
simulations until a node is completely depleted. 
Figure 3 shows that the modified OLSR outperforms the 
standard OLSR in term of network lifetime. This indicates that 
our algorithm avoids intermediate nodes that have a low residual 
energy value, which extends a bit little the life time of these 
nodes. Even though the intermediate nodes that been chosen, 
maybe not consist the shortest path to the destination. 
Figure 4, illustrates that as the number of nodes augments, a 
lot of packets will be lost due to network congestion, thus we 
notice a significant augmentation in Packet Lost Ratio for both 
protocols. But we observe a bit little improvement in the case of 
modified OLSR, due to the fact that our scheme takes in 
consideration the value of MAC queue utilization when 
deciding to receive more messages, so when a node has a full 
MAC queue, all packets sent to it, will be dropped, that are most 
likely to cause loss of packets. 
We observe that as the number of nodes increase in the 
network, the improvement in both network lifetime and Packet 
delivery Ratio PDR decreases, due to the fact that number of 
packets moved in the network augments, which causes a lack of 
robustness of our method to adjust with highly changing 
dynamic environment. 
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In MANETs, the lack of centralized control leads to the fact 
that the behavior of individual nodes has a profound effect on 
network performance. On of major examples of this problem, is 
when users reject to relay requests for the sake of energy 
resources, which presents a selfish behavior. 
In this paper, we have introduced an incentive technique for 
inducing forwarding cooperation during routing packets. We 
have taken the proactive routing protocol OLSR as a case study. 
Then we have modeled the problem of routing with nodes’ 
selfishness as a game-theoretic approach. We consider the 
competitive relationships between the transmitters and their 
neighbors in MANET as a simultaneous game and give the 
corresponding game theoretical formulation in detail. Moreover, 
one simple proposed solution is presented for the problem. 
Simulation results show that our method integrated in OLSR 
protocol reduces both energy consumption and packet lost ratio, 
and increases network lifetime compared with the standard 
OLSR. 
Different extensions can be considered as future work. The 
most natural one is to find a way to modeling the relationships 
as another kind of game called: coalition game, which may give 
more potential solution for the nodes’ selfishness problem, by 
using another type of cooperation among nodes in network. 
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